The article approaches the topic of social trust from an evolutionary perspective. It begins by summarising the most influential approaches that have defined specific and social trust and ascertains what causes differences in degrees of trust and how the potential risk of deception might be lowered. It then notes that the basis of morality had already been formed during the era of prehistoric man, who was able to create coalitions against aggressors and to socially control the behaviour of deviants. It points out, however, that having a certain predisposition to behaving cooperatively or an increased sensitivity to recognising and not tolerating behaviour aimed at abusing cooperation is not a sufficient guarantee of the fact that people will always (or at least in the majority of situations) favour cooperation over deception. One of the reasons for this is a tendency to favour short-term gains over long-term ones. The article argues that establishing norms (moral, social and legal) produces a higher level of social trust because it not only "encourages" individuals to behave in certain ways in particular situations but also works as a sanction which "discourages" the individual from socially deviant behaviour. The article then focuses on a debate about the causal relationship between social trust and social capital. It discusses the suggestion that political institutions, government and the judiciary may reduce rather than raise levels of social capital and consequently also the level of social trust. This is partly because of their powerful position and the consequent scope for corruption and partly because of the fact that even when attempting to act honestly, representatives of these institutions cannot sufficiently reflect upon dynamic change at the local level. Finally, the article ends by adopting the position that social trust is built primarily from bottom up and so it is risky to continually doubt the very existence and usefulness of social norms and morality and to be governed simply by legal norms.
Introduction
Insecurity in the labour market and in social care and pension provision, the falling number of productive people, rising unemployment, the increasing risk of repossession, decreasing levels of consumer spending-all these are phenomena familiar to our fellow citizens across the globe. They are phenomena that are spreading across western democracies and impacting negatively on the rest of the world as well. They are phenomena that can be included amongst the global changes affecting the lives of almost every individual. They are phenomena that are leading to marked increases in levels of fear, helplessness, suspicion HUMAN AFFAIRS 23, 443-457, 2013 DOI: 10.2478 and distrust in people. At the same time, unprecedented mobility from village to city and from one country to another encourage the mixing of cultures and the use of new means of communication-the mass media, the web and the internet-which also have an impact on those who do not move away from their birthplace. A variety of mutually incompatible value systems are thus colliding with each other, disrupting traditional ways of life and directional markers, thus further shaking the ground under the feet of those who already feel insecure. Alongside this, stable social norms and ethical systems are weakening, both in the commercial sector (modesty, hard work, honour, responsibility and respect) and in the family sphere (fewer marriages and children, more single mothers and divorces, and less intergenerational cohesion). In this situation of weakening social norms, the limits of the possible, the necessary and the forbidden are increasingly determined by legal norms. Hand in hand with this, fundamental change is occurring; that which is not forbidden is allowed-the current slogan goes, and those who are familiar with legal loopholes do things which would be unacceptable from a moral viewpoint. Given that the various political, governmental, legal and financial elites can make use of different legal manoeuvres for their own benefit and given that corruption is simply given lip service leaving the main culprits unaffected, the low levels of trust citizens display towards various political and public institutions and even themselves should come as no surprise. Globalisation itself is not a new phenomenon; indeed, it has inevitably been occurring since the beginning of human history, from the time of the original hunter-gatherer groups through establishment of villages, tribes, chiefdoms, towns and states to the grouping of states within supranational entities. The benefits include the exchange of non-regenerative resources, goods, services, information, the division of labour, mutual cultural enrichment and so forth. In order for the benefits of globalisation to outweigh the negatives, however, cooperation must be deepened. This is hard to imagine without an increase in social trust amongst people, without people behaving as moral individuals who do not attempt to deceive or cheat each other at the first available opportunity or at the first legal loophole that presents itself.
The level of social trust is linked to many exogenous and endogenous determinants. These range from (a) macrosocial factors, like income inequality, non/hierarchical religions (Bjørnskov 2006) , ethnic diversity (Bj�rnskov 2006; Gerritsen and Lubbers 2010) , (b) political-institutional impacts of state, like support for cooperation, dampening deception, reducing inequality, decreasing corruption (Putnam 2000; Herreros 2004; Rothstein 2005; Robbins 2011 ), (c) individual demographic characteristics, like gender, age, educational level, income (Roumeliotou, Rontos 2009), (d) core personality characteristics like optimism and capacity to control the world (Uslaner 2002) and (e) membership of voluntary organisations (Putnam 2000) . Delhey and Newton (2003) stress that different theories of trust, mainly societal (few conflicts and high safety), personal social networks (friends) and individual (success, well-being) apply best according to the level of trust in different countries and/or societies. A substantial degree of attention should, however, be focused on the relations between social and moral norms and social trust. This article approaches social trust from an evolutionary perspective and posits that these norms may have a crucial role to play in the emergence and strengthening of social trust. The structure of the article is as follows: first it discusses the different kinds and degrees of trust and ways of reducing deception, it then looks at social control and evolutionary developed mechanisms of cooperation. It analyses the way in which social trust is fostered by various kinds of norms and looks at the causal relationship between trust and social capital and finally endorses the importance of social and moral norms.
Social trust, differences in degree and ways of reducing deception
The trust we feel towards another is an expression of our estimations, assumptions, beliefs or expectations of the extent to which that person is trustworthy, that is, the extent to which we expect that person will fulfil their obligations towards us or towards others and will not attempt to deceive. Dependent on this is the extent to which we are willing to directly interact and cooperate with him/her or recommend him/her as a suitable partner to others or even to suggest that he/she represents our interests in various institutions. On the one hand, the level of trust we bestow upon others depends on how well we know them in terms of our own personal experiences or via information gained from others. On the other hand, we also interact with those unknown to us, forcing us to decide whether and to what extent we can trust them or not. Herreros (2004) distinguishes between "specific trust", that is, trust in people known to us and general "social trust" in strangers. While the first is created on the basis of repeated interactions among people within a particular group, the second is more like a one-shot prisoner's dilemma.
The well-known prisoner's dilemma is based on game theory and demonstrates how, from a long-term perspective and in repeated interaction, mutual cooperation is most advantageous. However, where one-off interaction is concerned, opting to cooperate is the worst possible option for either party should the other party deceive him/her. Moreover, either party will profit the most if they deceive the other party regardless of whether the other party opts to cooperate or deceive. Therefore, in one-off interactions there is more of a tendency to deceive than to cooperate. The dilemma arises because, although both interacting parties know that cooperation is the best strategy for them both to profit, they are also aware that no matter what their opponent does, the most advantageous course of action is to betray him/her.
Nonetheless, (one-off and repeated) interaction often occurs between strangers and it is by no means the case that each interaction leads to non-cooperation and deception. Yet, mutual reciprocity does not always occur simultaneously. Many goods and services must be paid for in advance, while others may be settled later either in kind or financially. Therefore, one party has to bestow trust in the other first of all and thus may be put at a disadvantage. However, a failure to bestow trust would mean that no transaction would take place. The ability to bestow a certain degree of trust in a stranger is essential to the functioning of a deeply stratified society in which role-sharing is fundamental to its ability to operate. Since mutual transactions are generally useful and beneficial, how can we best reduce the risk of potential deception?
In his work based on rational choice theory and emphasising a cost-benefit analysis, the sociologist Coleman (1990) distinguishes between three kinds of trust, or rather, three different ways of reducing the risks in deciding whether or not the other party can be trusted. The first is an attempt to turn the asymmetrical relationship into a symmetrical one-with trust on both sides-which can be achieved either by both parties taking on the role of the trusted and the trusting or by offering unilateral high gains. Thus, both parties find themselves in the position of provider and recipient of different goods and services or one party increases his/her own value to such an extent that the other party will once again require him/her in the future. The gains offered by the second party need not be material, but could, for instance, involve a willingness to offer assistance, friendship or love. Another way of reducing the risks is to find a trustworthy intermediary, that is, an agent who trusts one of the parties in the transaction and is trusted by the other. The third way is to trust a third party, who does not, however, take on the role of intermediary, but who carries out a number of transactions with both parties.
While all three methods may be considered effective, there is a substantial qualitative difference between them in that, in both the second and third methods, trust is bestowed upon a third party who gains the trust of one or both participants in the transaction on the basis of his/her long-term reputation. Thus the nature of the trust bestowed upon the third party is specific rather than general. The first of the proposed methods cannot be used in situations that require general social trust as well. This is because in order for an asymmetric relationship to become a symmetrical one, repeated interaction is required; this is not the same as a one-shot prisoner dilemma, since both parties cannot simultaneously provide and receive goods or services. Offering the other party high gains also works better in repeated interaction than in one-off interactions, where it has been shown that conversely the greater the potential gain, the greater the risk of deception. Buskens (2002) is even convinced that not only does trustworthiness decrease as temptation increases, but that it is more dependent on the potential gains (i.e. high gains lower the level of trustworthiness) than on personal characteristics. Thus, he believes that in order to overcome initial distrust, in particular, there is a need to conclude formal agreements and contracts, which increases the trustworthiness of the other party. This means that sanctions can be applied to compensate for potential losses stemming from deception and that the propensity to abuse trust is reduced.
However, this kind of solution brings us back to the beginning of the entire problem, or at least, to the beginning of the never-ending circle, whereby if we replace social norms and morals with legal norms, then many of those involved will seek out legal loopholes and attempt to abuse them. Moreover, this approach is more applicable to extensive commercial and financial transactions undertaken by large corporations than to ordinary everyday transactions based on social trust. The point of this kind of trust is that it reduces the time, energy and financial costs associated with drawing up formal agreements.
Furthermore, the suggestions for reducing risk provided above do not explain the differences in degree of general social trust between individuals, groups, societies, cultures and states. Indeed, in terms of social trust, individuals and societies differ markedly. This has been demonstrated in extensive surveys examining the trust people bestow upon public and societal institutions showing that there are significant differences between countries and between different time periods (historical) within the same state 2 . An example from everyday life might be the way a homeowner behaves towards workmen during the refurbishment of a building. Many owners leave the workers alone to carry out the agreed work and also give them access to the keys for a few days, while others continually check up on and watch over them. In neither case is there a formal agreement.
Uslaner (2002) attempts to explain the difference in a completely different way using the concept of moral values. He distinguishes between "strategic trust", which we conditionally form towards people we know, since on the basis of our own experiences with them we can predict how they will behave, and "moral trust" towards strangers, which is an unconditional moral commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy. He believes that this is based on a fundamental ethical presupposition that most people share our fundamental moral values and belong to our moral community. Although Uslaner states that moral trust is unconditional and a relatively stable value, he suggests that it is formed in childhood, primarily acquired through our parents and that it is also influenced by government institutions, since it is stronger in countries with greater economic equality, redistributive policies and less corruption. Social trust, therefore, he argues, is conditional on both micro and macro social influences. There is no reason to doubt this premise, since there is a wealth of empirical evidence for it.
Accepting his premise for unconditional moral trust towards strangers is, however, far more problematic. From an evolutionary perspective, this conception is unsustainable. Bestowing uncritical trust upon everyone else is not a stable strategy in evolutionary terms because cheaters would thus be "fitter" than those who were too trusting. Regardless of the evolutionary perspective, even general experience indicates not only that not everyone can be equally trusted but also that a particular person can sometimes be trusted over certain issues yet not over others. Moreover, deciding whether we can trust the other party depends on the actual situation the two parties find themselves in and not simply on ability to estimate the risks of deception. For instance, those in need are more willing to subject themselves to greater risks of possible deception than others. Coleman (1990) postulates the general rule that people are more likely to overestimate trustworthiness in situations where the potential gains are exceptionally high in comparison to the potential losses and vice versa. An extreme example is one where a person finds themselves in a hopeless situation which they cannot get out of without the help of another. Thus if that person is offered help, it is more rational to accept it even if the person believes the chance of the other person helping him/her is almost zero, since the desperate person has nothing to lose, i.e. it will not be any more detrimental than receiving no help at all 3 . In other words, people trust others more if they stand to gain a lot and lose a little, and trust less if they stand to gain little and lose a lot, i.e. the greater the vulnerability and dependence, the greater the trust bestowed upon a stranger.
Social control and cooperation
Social trust is a prerequisite for cooperation. This is because effective cooperation between many people in today's stratified world occurs only when the majority of people trust that the other(s) will not cheat even if it would be more advantageous for them to do so in the short term. In relation to the dilemma of whether or not to cooperate, Rothstein (2005) employs the concept of "social traps", which aptly expresses the logic that when there is no trust there is non-cooperation, that is, the social trap snaps shut, which in the long-term is worse for everybody than if they had cooperated. Since human society is characterised by growing cooperation, essential to the current high levels of labour division, a relatively high degree of social trust must exist amongst interacting individuals. It is useful to look at the way in which social trust gradually emerged and how its moral and rational dimensions can be viewed as complementary rather than antagonistic viewpoints from an evolutionary perspective.
Anthropologist Christopher Boehm (2002) believes that the mutual ancestor of humans and the two Pan species living approximately five million years ago was able to engage in protomoral behaviours concerning displaying rebellion against alpha bullying and aversion to internecine conflict. Once these active interventions became collective instruments of social control in suppressing conflicts and once language permitted the definition of forbidden behaviours, then full-blown morality, he concludes, was able to develop. Since early humans lived in egalitarian bands, he considers bullying-the attempt of one individual to gain dominance over the others using aggression and thus disrupting the egalitarianism-to be the most likely candidate for the first behaviour to have been considered morally deviant. Social controls consisted of creating coalitions against such aggressors in order to punish them. Boehm points out that political and power coalitions were already to be found amongst primates. Around 100,000 years ago, anatomically modern humans were endowed with much larger brains and a more advanced form of communication enabling them to contain not only domination behaviours of alpha individuals but also any behaviour considered deleterious to the group. Contemporaneous egalitarian bands, Boehm argues, such as egalitarian nomadic hunter-gatherer bands (predecessors of larger hierarchically based groups having adopted the tribal sedentary lifestyle) are distinguished by the fact that they check behaviours so that individuals do not behave tyrannically, that is, that they do not deceive and avoid attempts to cooperate and they do not commit serious deception, theft, adultery, incest and rape.
Cultural anthropologist Bruce M. Knauft (2002) suggests that morality began to emerge as part of the wider-ranging conditions and circumstances that our predecessors had to deal with and it is estimated to date back to roughly two million years ago. Besides attempts to eliminate bullying behaviour and encourage egalitarianism, the early evolution of human morality included other elements, such as constraints on sexual behaviour, a rudimentary division of labour, the gendering of morality, socialised control over junior males, increased group size and increased home range size (ibid., 130). Knauft emphasises the need for elaborate communication and culturally developed beliefs and associated practices that constitute the symbolic dimension of morality, since morality is considered to be a symbolic or ideological construct that is substantially internalised. As Knauft puts it, "The internalization of moral rules in accordance with culturally prescribed norms is a distinctive feature of human morality largely lacking in non-human primates" (ibid., 131).
In the context of social trust the most fundamental aspect of morality is that, regardless of when exactly it began to emerge and the range of behaviours it responded to or targeted, its main function was the social control of undesirable behaviour, including uncooperative behaviour or behaviour that did not respect the equal division of labour amongst the members of the community. It is highly likely, indeed almost certain, that people today have adapted to a certain level of cooperative behaviour and are also exceptionally sensitive to recognising and not tolerating behaviours that attempt to take advantage of the cooperation of others. Had these abilities not evolved, there would be no (social) trust and hence neither would we have a human society that is characterised by a high level of division of labour and cooperation.
Having an innate disposition to behaving morally, however, does not mean that people will always behave as moral beings. So long as cooperation brings greater gains than noncooperation, people will help one another. However, they will also consider whether it would not be more effective for them to attempt to invest the smallest possible amount and extract the greatest possible gain in their mutual efforts to achieve their stated goals (such as mutual defence of territory, animal hunting, land cultivation, hut building, waste separation, collaborative research and article writing). This is related to the fact that individuals will favour a smaller reward, achievable in the here and now without cooperation, over a larger reward to be gained over a longer period of time and through cooperation. According to Ainslie (2001) there is extensive evidence to suggest that people are able to assess the true value of a reward even relatively closely to the moment it is obtained 4 . He also states, on the basis of experimental findings, that people spontaneously evaluate future events in inverse proportion to their expectations of the events occurring. Thus, there is a temporary preference for the worse but more immediate of the two alternative goals in the period immediately prior to the worse option becoming achievable. Ainslie also points out that although opting for the better long-term alternative always involves cooperation, it will only appear more attractive than an impulsive con if we expect or plan to continue with it in the future. Hence, his argument also implies that trust, like trustworthiness, will mainly increase provided there is repeated interaction between the interested parties. In his view, the solution to avoiding experimenting with short-term gains lies in our seeing that the current choice is a precedent that predicates similar choices in the future, which may limit our tendency to make shortsighted temporary preferences. At least as important, however, is the fact that other people who are direct witnesses of our behaviour or who become involved via direct witnesses perceive this as precedence. In this way potential participants can create an impression of us and on that basis decide whether to interact with us and if so to what extent.
Given that people have a tendency to cooperate and deceive uncritical social trust in strangers would be a serious disadvantage. Nonetheless, it is clear that a degree of social trust is essential, despite the fact that sometimes the end result is not favourable. For instance we trust that the majority of drivers will drive responsibly, despite the fact that car crashes occur on a daily basis. We trust that we will be served food that is not harmful, despite suffering from the occasional stomach upset. We trust that if we buy goods or services over the internet we will receive them despite the fact that sometimes the transaction does not go according to our expectations. We trust one other because without mutual cooperation we would not survive.
Applying an evolutionary perspective provides us with three main evolutionary mechanisms for (mutual) help and cooperation: (1) kinship altruism (Hamilton 1964) , i.e. helping those with whom we are most closely genetically linked, primarily our closest relatives, (2) reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) , i.e. helping those who are not kin, with the expectation that they will return the favour in the future, and (3) reputation (Frank 1990) , which enhances the appeal of those who are reliable and who fulfil their obligations, in the sense that others are happy to cooperate with them.
Despite the effectiveness of these mechanisms, not everyone behaves according to them, and even if we discover that someone (a person, organisation or company) has not acted honestly, that does not mean that we will never again trust them over something. One of the deciding factors that significantly impacts on the level of social trust, even in these situations, is the existence of norms that explicitly lay out the rules for cooperation and reciprocity and also reduce the risk of deception as they involve sanctions.
Norms
Moral norms, which have been part of our lives for hundreds and thousands of years, are more stable and more universal than other norms. Maintaining these norms was so important for the survival of the members of the community that evolution equipped us with strong emotional reactions which kick in spontaneously when we see these norms being broken. Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) suggest, on the basis of considerable empirical findings, that in every society, and even in other animal species, emotional responses automatically appear and are "released" in situations involving the following: harm/care (e.g. being sensitive to or disliking pain and suffering in others, particularly the young and vulnerable), fairness/reciprocity, (e.g. negative reactions to those who do not return a kindness), authority/respect (e.g. anger towards those who do not show the appropriate signs of respect. Similarly Rozin et al. (1999) concluded, on the basis of experiments, (using Americans and Japanese people as a sample) that there are three (moral) emotionsanger, contempt and disgust that are triggered in all cultures when the social order is disrupted (even when it does not affect us personally). We are therefore predisposed, even without conscious effort, to react to strong emotional feelings signalling a serious breach of social order, thus enabling us to safeguard it against deviants and to carry out effective social controls.
Social norms differ from moral norms in that they are less stable, less universal and trigger fewer emotional reactions when broken. Also, adherence to social norms is more conditional and more dependent on the authorities's attitudes. In other words, social norms are less internalised then moral norms. They also emerged spontaneously and gradually in small communities as the members sought to solve conflict situations involving reciprocity and cooperation in particular. They are like moral norms in that they are designed to reduce the tendency to deceive or to favour short-term goals over long-term ones. Bicchieri (2006, 11) sets out the conditions under which social norms exist as follows:
(1) Individual knows that a rule exists and applies to given situation (contingency) (2) Individual prefers to conform to the rule in a given situation on the condition that (conditional preference):
a. he/she believes that a sufficiently large subset of population conforms to the rule in a given situation (empirical expectation) and either b. he/she believes that a sufficiently large subset of population expects him/her to conform to the rule in a given situation (normative expectation) or c. he/she believes that a sufficiently large subset of population expects him/her to conform to the rule in a given situation, prefers him/her to conform, and may sanction behaviour (normative expectation with sanctions). Finally, mention should be made of the legal norms that are embodied in laws, rules and regulations and, which, unlike social and moral norms, are formally stipulated by an authority-the state-and fully define the punishments for breaking them. All three kinds of norms should above all work to ensure that people have the least compulsion to make greater gains through deception than they deserve for the effort afforded and to deter people from attempting to acquire something that does not belong to them. All three therefore have a role to play in enhancing social trust. It is on the basis of their existence that we are able to engage with strangers since we suppose that they hold basic moral values and behave in accordance with them and will be deterred from deviant behaviour through fear of punishment for breaking the norms.
Causal relationship between trust and social capital
Social trust is significantly associated with social capital. Loury (1977) originally wanted to use this term to draw attention to the fact that the social origins of the individual have a significant impact on his/her ability to invest in human capital, i.e. education, work experience and other physical and mental activities that impact positively on a person. Today, social capital tends more to indicate the social status of a person, which is created by the extent to which he or she is actively involved in various institutions (including the family), associations and organisations (formal, non-formal and voluntary) thus expanding the density and quality of his/her social networks.
One of the first systematic concepts of social capital was elaborated by Bourdieu (1986) and it consists of social obligations/duties which can be converted into economic capital under certain conditions. On the one hand, social capital is understood to be the total current or potential sources that a group as a whole has at its disposal. However, he also states that the amount of social capital an individual has depends on the scope of the relationships within the network that can be mobilised and on the amount of capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) a person can legitimately demand from others on the basis of his/her own prior investment. The link between social trust and social capital is held in the fact that social capital is dependent on the trustworthiness of the social environment in question i.e. on the degree to which the person entitled to call in the favour can be certain that it will be repaid (for more detail see, for instance, Coleman 1990). However, opinions diverge in explanations of the mutual relationship between social trust and social capital concerning the flow of causality between them.
On the one hand, one might suppose that participating in an association would result not only in more specific, but also more general, social trust and that this would then increase the amount of social capital. This is the position taken by Putnam (2000) , for example, when he argues that frequent interaction between individuals within a social network encourages mutual reciprocity and trustworthiness and also facilitates gossip, which is an important means of cultivating one's reputation. He also distinguishes between specific reciprocity, where people directly repay others for their services, and generalised reciprocity, where one person takes it upon him/herself to do something for another, believing that when the need arises, a third person will return the favour. In evolutionary biology, instead of generalised reciprocity, the concept of indirect reciprocity is used (see, for instance, Alexander 1987), referring to mutual assistance within a group, where it is in the individual interest of each individual member. Indirect reciprocity spreads partly due to the fact that if the members of the group see that someone has behaved altruistically, they then behave altruistically towards that person, because he/she will gain a good reputation. In this way, then, trust is created and flows from bottom up and as it grows it positively impacts on the growth of social capital as well. It brings positive benefits not only to the individual but also to the whole group. The various associations and organisations of which we are voluntary members greatly resemble the traditional egalitarian groups of hunter-gatherers in the sense that their members knew each other and repeated interaction between them increased the level of mutual trust. In groups like these, it is also possible to create informal social norms and ensure that they are being adhered to. Besides these reciprocal commitments, social capital also increases with secondary information which does not directly concern the activities of the the associations and organisations in which the individual participates but may be extremely important to that person (Herreros 2004) . For instance, a member of a gardening club may obtain information from other members about good doctors, reliable workmen, a good job opportunity, an appealing holiday etc. In this way, trust also spreads among the members of the association even to people who do not belong to the local group. Even though people are generally members of a number of groups, this kind of secondary information may lead to the formation of a wider network of trustworthy people, who can be relied upon in various situations. Personal experience significantly affects our expectations and therefore we can reliably assume that the degree of general trust placed in strangers grows in direct proportion to the number of trustworthy individuals that a person interacts with.
On the other hand, it is believed that social trust spreads top down. This means that trustworthy political institutions positively influence the creation of social capital and this then increases trust and cooperation. This is the position taken by Rothstein (2005) , who argues that a non-corrupt government, judiciary and political institutions can help overcome the social traps of distrust and non-cooperation by increasing the amount of social capital. His three-part causal mechanism is based on three kinds of judgements (inferences) people make: 1. judgements about public officials-if they behave in a corrupt way, then people believe that even those who really should abide by the law cannot be trusted. 2. judgements about people in general-the awareness that the majority of people in a society where officials are corrupt must also participate in corruption, bribery and nepotism in order that they can obtain the things they believe they are entitled to and so they are not to be trusted. 3. judgements based on ourselves-in this kind of society even citizens who consider it morally wrong have to participate in bribery, corruption and nepotism. Therefore they infer that if they themselves are not to be trusted then nor can they trust other people in general. However, what this judgement mechanism in fact explains is how and why people might become distrusting; it says nothing about how and why trust emerges and how it can be increased. The Achilles heel of this conception, however, lies primarily in the fact that it does not explain which conditions and circumstances are required for trustworthy government and political institutions to emerge. To assume, particularly these days, that these institutions have an automatic interest in creating and instituting laws in such a way that they directly enrich the state and wealth of the majority of its citizens would be exceptionally naive. It is first and foremost a significant section of ruling and government representatives with links to the many elites found amongst multinational companies, the business community and bankers, and shielded by adroit lawyers, which most attempts to evade legislation and seek out possible gaps that can be turned to its own advantage. As soon as those involved with this conglomerate are caught in corrupt practices their automatic glib reply is that everything they did was in accordance with the law. They therefore fall back exclusively on legal norms, since they believe that their lawyers will be able to exonerate them. Morality is never given a mention. Some companies, in conjunction with their lawyers, act unfairly by creating contracts with the aim of "ensnaring" the other party in something disadvantageous, of which they are initially unaware, since as members of the lay public they are not as familiar with the law as these cunning professionals. When these kinds of corrupt business practices are revealed, the companies behave as if they were innocent, since legally it all looks in order.
In sharp contrast to this kind of behaviour, Jackson et al. (2011, 3) found "that most people obey most laws most of the time, because they think it is the right thing to do, or they have simply acquired the habit of doing so", which suggests that social and moral norms have a significant impact on human behaviour. The authors also discovered that in countries where people believe that the police share a common moral framework with them, they feel a stronger duty to obey police directives. Moreover, from the findings of Jackson et al. (ibid.) it is evident that the norm of fairness seems to play a crucial role in strengthening social trust, to the extent that the Nordic countries trust the police and courts and their institutions much more than ex-Communist countries where people perceive there to be corruption in the criminal justice system.
The judiciary impacts greatly on levels of social trust. It has an important role in ensuring that those who break legal norms are duly punished. Punishment is not primarily intended as revenge but rather as a deterrent to others so that they do not act against the law. It is a mechanism which can fundamentally help increase levels of general social trust. If, however, the judiciary is corrupt and citizens display high levels of distrust towards it and law enforcement is almost utopic, then social trust levels fall dramatically, since there is no other institution that can fully take over the task of establishing whether the law has been adhered to. In this kind of situation, it is doubtful whether the concept of independent judicial power is the optimum solution. What is the ordinary citizen in Slovakia to think in following the scandal of the president's failure to appoint the general prosecutor despite his having been elected by parliament. Both sides in this conflict (the as-yet-unappointed prosecutor and the president) have repeatedly submitted objections of impartiality against member after member of the Constitutional Court, which is to decide the case. The highest constitutional representatives have therefore made it clear to the public that they do not trust the highest representatives of constitutional power and that particular individuals are more important in deciding the case than the legal merits of the case itself. Rothstein is therefore indisputably correct in saying that many governments and political institutions, or at least a significant proportion of their representatives, contribute substantially to decreasing levels of social trust.
However, in fulfilling the requirement that we should be represented by honourable, erudite and wise politicians, it is unrealistic to expect that all problems can be solved from top down since no-one has the capacity to cover all the relevant contexts that have emerged due to dynamic technological and information changes and to respond to them effectively. Many of the conflicts occurring within different organisations can be more competently resolved by groups of people who are directly engaged in and familiar with the problem. A predominantly top down approach is in fact very passive from the perspective of the majority of citizens, since it leads to citizens becoming increasingly less involved in something they consider to be beneficial (to themselves and to those around them) leaving the power and the decision-making about their lives in the hands of a small group of political and government elites.
Importance of social and moral norms in strengthening social trust
Specific trust emerges within the relationships that the vast majority of people create first of all at the immediate family level and then gradually expand to include others around them 5 . An individual who grows up in an environment of trust will tend to trust people he/she meets for the first time more than an individual who grows up in an environment with a high level of mutual distrust. This is another counter-argument against the notion that general social trust is independent from specific trust, or even that it could precede it. Similarly, from a historical perspective, norms emerged first of all in small groups of hunter-gatherers and it was only much later that many of them were replaced by formal laws. All this points to the fact that specific trust reinforced by informal social norms was essential to the emergence of general social trust and the ensuing social capital.
However, applying and relying on social norms exclusively is not without its difficulties. Despite the fact that it strengthens cohesion within groups, it frequently leads to great intergroup tension and conflict as the groups fight amongst themselves. Moreover, not all social norms gave equal rights and duties to all the members of the community and so they have been disputed by disadvantaged groups and their supporters. Similarly, much criticism has been directed at many moral norms, particularly those based on religious doctrines, for being archaic, excessive and for not reflecting the changing conditions in a changing world. However, justified criticism against traditional forms of coexistence, contempt for them and attempts to institute a new, fairer and more egalitarian legal system from above through legislative change has weakened the original values and any behaviour considered to be at the margins of the law has become acceptable without consideration of ethical principles.
A judge at the German Federal Constitutional Court, Udo di Fabio (2009) , has highlighted the fact that while the political powers enforce behaviour through legislation, free society is increasingly reluctant to apply straightforward social norms in everyday life and is even ashamed to insist on them outside the law. The main contemporary (anti-enlightenment) social norm is considered to be silent liberal tolerance, characterised by the attitude "do not offend". He warns against the negative consequences of weakening sound traditions and of coexistence, the suppression of civic regulation of behaviour and the loss of value reference points. Fukuyama (2006) documents how, between the 1960s and the 1980s, values were turned upside down and the decline in trust was accompanied in many liberal democracies in various parts of the world by an increase in crimes against property and violent crimes. The current crisis began partly due to the fact that ethical values had disappeared from the banking sphere.
It would be extremely challenging to find satisfactory empirical evidence on the direct impact social and moral norms have on social trust. This is because studying how these norms function not only in different countries but also in businesses, institutions and organisations and the way in which they are shaped, checked and maintained at many local levels would require a great deal of time and energy and also exceptionally sophisticated methodological tools. It is much easier to compare measures such as demographic characteristics, perceptions of levels of corruption, the trustworthiness of various institutions, membership of organisations, numbers of friends, and so forth, as is the current trend in research concerning social trust. Nonetheless, it is possible to find data that lends support to the notion that social and moral norms are important. For instance Grönlund and Setälä (2011) , on the basis of empirical analysis (European Social Survey Round 2 Data 2004), conclude that social trust is connected with trust in parliament and the legal system. On one side of the line lie Nordic countries characterized by high trust towards parliament and the legal system and high social trust. On the other side are post-communist countries with low trust towards parliament and the legal system and low social trust. This would indicate that government institutions have a primary influence on levels of social trust. However, at the same time, they found that it is the perception of public officials acting in line with cooperative norms like honesty which explains trust in parliament. Above the findings of Jackson et al. (2011) were analysed stressing the norm of fairness. Both examples empirically confirm that social and moral norms play a significant role in strengthening social trust. Therefore, questioning, mocking and rejecting social and moral norms and respecting only legal norms does not lead to a better functioning society with a higher level of social trust but rather the reverse.
Conclusion
It is useful to have reservations about social norms that no longer reflect current ways of life and to alter or replace them with more effective ones. However, the usefulness of social norms as such should not be questioned so long as social trust is a desirable value. Norms should be created and shaped at the local level by the people whom they benefit. Legal norms can also play a positive role, so long as they are not intended to replace social and moral norms, but to strengthen them and to extend those that can be meaningfully applied across many different groups and supplemented. A positive aspect of legislation is that it can suppress social norms created by mafia gangs or racist or fascist groups and others for the purpose of harming other members of society. It is worth mentioning, however, that adherence to legislative norms is regulated by the representatives of political and government institutions. The decisions they make have no direct impact on themselves since they are not members of the groups that breached the norms. They can, however, increase their gains through corrupt practices and the risks they face are far lower than those for ordinary citizens. By contrast, adherence to informal social norms is monitored by members of the group directly affected by breach of these norms and so they are prompted to resolve problems in the fairest way through direct involvement.
Citizens of countries where there is trust in the social order and where a great number of voluntary and professional organisations abide by social and moral norms and people's behaviour is co-determined by morality, ethics and virtues have good reason to assume that they will obtain non-harmful food in the shops, that doctors will do everything to improve their health, that teachers will conscientiously prepare for their lessons, that workers will conduct their work honestly and so forth. They know that the occasional failure to satisfy their expectations will lead to serious consequences for the person responsible. Social trust, and the cooperation built upon it, is unthinkable without functioning social norms and morality.
